Absrmcr-Conventionally; the majoriQ of network routing protocols BSsume that every network terminal or link will forward data for others without any deviation. However, t h i s may not be true when the terminals or links are owned by individual selfirh meis, who will always try to maximize their own benefits instead of faithfully following a prescribed protocol. In t h i s paper, we propose a new muting protocol, called k-anyeast routing, that works well even if network links (or te-als or bath) are selfish. In our protocol, the soume node will fin1 find B tree that spans k receivers out of P set of possible receivers and pay thc relay links to compensate their costs. We prove that every relay link will follow the routing protocol: it maximizes its profit when it declares its actual cost. 0-7803-8784-8/$20.00 (C) 2004 IEEE
I. INTRODUCTION
Routing has been studied extensively since the bom of the Internet. Several types of routing methods such as unicast and multicast have been used to meet with the demand of different applications. In this paper, we propose a new routing method called k-anycast, which is an extension of anycast. Unlike multicast and unicast, anycast is a communication between a single sender and the nearest k receivers among a group of receivers. Anycast could happen both in network and application layer. One application of anycast is.router table updating: one router initiates an update of a routing-table for a group of routers by sending the data to its nearest router. The router received the data sends the data to its nearest router that has not received the data yet. Repeat this process until all routers in that group receive the data. With the suppon by P v 6 , anycast is expected to he deployed more widely in the near future. Unfortunately, like unicast and multicast, anycast has its own drawbacks. Let us reconsider the routing-table updating scenario. Remember that when a router receives the data, it should send it to its nearest router that has not received the data yet. What if the router went down or reboot before it sentlreceived the data? Obviously, this will result that part of the routers will not he able to receive the data. Another concem about anycast is that the updating process is serialized, which may take a long time. Thus, it would be much better if we could send data to several routers instead of one. Now we consider another scenario in which anycast takes place in application layer: a group of users wants to download a movie via some Peer-to-Peer file-sharing systems, i.e, BitTorrent. Due to the large population of group members, every member usually retrieves the movie from some of the members. In order to speed up the download, the source will choose these members that are not far away.
Notice in both applications mentioned above, the source needs to deliver the data to more than one but not all receivers.
Thus, we design a new routing method called k-anycasr to solve these problems. We formally define a k-anycast problem as following. Assume that there is a source node s and a group Q of potential receivers. We need to build a tree rooted at s that spans ' at least k nodes in Q. Here k could be any value between 1 and IQ/. If k = 1 then it is the traditional anycast problem. When k = IQ\, it becomes the multicast problem.
In this paper, we study the k-anycast problem in a different network setting. It has been taken for granted for decades by most network routing protocols that each network lmklterminal will forward data packets as required without any deviation.
However, in fact, the traditional belief may not be true when network links or terminals are owned by individual users. For example, consider a library wireless ad hoc network where each wireless devise is owned by an individual student. The wireless devise is often powered by batteries only. Thus, it is often not in the best interest of a terminal to forward data packets for other terminals. When a terminal refuses to relay data for other while it is supposed to do so by a prescribed routing protocol, the network performance will degrade, and the network connectivity may be broken defacro. Thus, we need to design routing protocols that lake the user selfishness into account. How to achieve cooperation among terminals in selfish net- 
161, [7]
proposed several acceptance algorithms for each wireless node to decide whether to relay data for other nodes. However, these methods do not take the actual cost of each selfish node (or link) when it is asked to provide services to others.
In this paper, we assume that each network IinWterminal has a privately known cost of providing service for others and it will provide the service only when it gets a monetary payment enough to compensate its cost. We also assume that this cost is fixed and independent of how many children nodes it have in a routing structure. Clearly, simply paying each relay linklterminal its declared cost does not work since the selfish linklterminal will have incentives to lie its cost upward and hoping to improve its gain. [9] , [lo] , [lll, [121. However, VCG mechanisms do have their limitations: the output of the mechanism must maximize the total valuations of all agents: and thus they can he implemented in polynomial time only if we can find the optimal solution efficiently. For example, VCG mechanisms cannot be used to solve the multicast problem since it is W-hard to find the minimum cost multicast tree. To remedy this, we recently designed several incentive based methods for multicast [13], [14], [I51 that do not rely on VCG.
Here, we did not specify how to construct the k-anycast tree because we believe that different applications may need different trees. And in this paper, we only study the k-anycast using a structure that minimizes the maximum cost of all paths from the source to k selected receivers. For this k-anycast problem, if k > 1, as we will show later, a VCG mechanism does not work.
The main contribution of this paper is that we design the first non-VCG truthful payment scheme for k-anycast routing. We also conduct extensive simulations to study the ratio of the total payments over the total costs of all relay agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give some preliminaries and review some related works in Section 11. We propose our uuthful routing protocol for k-anycast in Section IJl. Simulation results are presented in Section N. We conclude our paper in Section V.
PRELIMINARIES AND PRIORI ART

A. Preliminaries
In this paper, we assume the network terminals or links are selfish and rational. Here an terminal or link is said to he selfish and rational if it responds to well-defined incentives and will deviate from the protocol only if it improves its gain. A standard model in the literature for analyzing scenarios in which the participants are selfish and rational is as follows.
Assume that there are n agents, which could he computers in peer-to-peer networks or network links in networks. Each agent i , fori E 11,. . . , n}, has some private information ti, called its type. Here, the type ti could be its minimum cost to forward a unit data in a network environment. Then the set all agents' type defineavectort= ( t l , t 2 , . . . ,tn).
A mechanism defines, for each agent i , a set of strategies Ai.
For each strategy vector a = ( a l , . . . , a n ) , i.e., agent i plays a strategy ai E A;, the mechanism computes an output o = O ( a ) and a payment vector p = (PI,. . . ,p,,), where pi = pi(.) is the money given to agent i . For each possible output o, agent i's preferences are given by a valuation function U; that assigns a real value ?,,(ti, 0 ) to output 0. Then the utility of agent i at the outcome of the game, given its preferences ti and strategies aselectedbyallagents,isui(ti,o) =ui(t;,o) +pi. , a , ) denote the vector of strategies of all agents except i.
for all a: # a, and all strategies b-; of agents other than i.
In other words, it maximizes its utility regardless of what other agents do. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if reporting its true type ti is one of the dominant strategies for i . A mechanism satisfies individual rationality if the agent's utility of participating is non-negative. A mechanism is strategyproof or truthful if it satisfies both I R and IC.
Arguably the most important result in mechanism design is what is usually called the generalized Wckrey-Clarke-Groves (VCC) mechanism [16], [17] , [18]. The VCG mechanism applies to maximization problems with a utilitarian objective function g(o,t), i.e., g(o,t) = C,vi(t;,o). A mechanism M = Let a-; = ( a l , . . . , a i -l , a ; + l ,
Here h i ( ) is an arbitrary function of tLi. A VCG mechanism satisfies IC property [I81 and under mild assumptions, VCG mechanisms are the only mechanism satisfying IC for utilitarian problems [191.
B. Current State ojKnowledge
Consider any communication network G = (V,E,c), ez,. . . ,em} is the set of links, and c is the cost vector of links. Given a source nodes and a destination node U,, we want to find the path with the minimum total cost. This path is known as the shortest path, denoted as LCP(s, U , , d). Consider all paths from source s to destination U;, they can he divided into two categories: with edge e j or not. The path having the minimum length among paths with edge ek is denoted as LCP,, (s, vi, d) ; and the path having the minimum length among these paths without edge eh is denoted as LCP_,,(s,u;,d) . Fixed the source, for simplicity we denote the length of LCP(s, ui, d ) as L(i,d),thelength of LCP,,(s,t,d) as.Ceh(i,d), andthe length of LCP-,, (s, i , d ) as Le, (i, d) if no confusion is caused.
In [9] , Nisan and Ronen gave a centralized polynomial-time truthful mechanism for unicast in a selfish network. The payment to a link e j E LCP(s,vi,d) is pj(d) = L e k ( i , d ) -Lek(i,dIfO), and the payment to a link ej LCP(s,vi,d) is 0. This payment scheme is truthful since it is a VCG mechanism. Feigenbaum et. a1 [Ill then addressed the truthful routing by assuming that each node incurs a transit cost for each transit packet. The mechanism again is a VCG mechanism. They gave a distributed method to compute the payment. Efficient centralized computing of payment is given in [IO] .
Several results have been proposed in the literature to deal with multicast in selfish networks. In [IZ], the authors considered the design of multicast networks when the selfish links have costs providing relay and the selfish receiver nodes have maximum willing payments. Recently, [14] studied designing truthful multicast mechanisms when all receivers will relay the data for peer receivers for free and every receiver demands the data from the source. They considered cases when network links are selfish or network terminals are selfish. They designed a truthful mechanism for each of the widely used multicast structures.
K-ANYCAST GAME
A. Problem Statement
Consider any communication network G = (V, E , c ) ,
. . ,U,,} is the set of terminals, E = { e l , e2, . . ,em} are the set of links, and c is the cost vector of links. Given a source node s and a set of possible receivers Q = { q l , 4 2 , . . . , qr} C V, the k-anycast problem 1 5 k 5 q is to select k terminals R from Q and build a tree that spans these k receivers R. In different applications, we may want to construct a k-anycast tree that optimizes different objectives. For example, we may want to minimize the total cost or minimize the maximum latency of the k-anycast tree. Here, we will consider the k-anycast tree whose longest distance between the source and the receivers is minimized. Given a graph G, we use w ( G ) to denote the total cost of all links in this graph. If we change the cost of a link e; to ci, we denote thenew networkas G' = (V,E, clid), or simply clici. If we remove one link e< from the network, we denote it as cIzco, i.e., the cost of link ei is assumed to be infinity. Sometimes we use G\e; to denote the network without link e<. For the simplicity of notation, we will use the cost vector c to denote the network G = (V, E , c ) if no confusion is caused.
In our protocol, a link e, is required to declare a cost d, of relaying the message. Based on the declared cost profile d, we should first select the k terminals among Q, and construct the kanycast tree, then decide the payment for all agents. The utility of an agent is its payment received, minus its cost if it is selected in the k-anycast tree.
In this paper, we construct the k-anycast tree as follows. First, we sort the receivers according to their distances from the source s. Let Q k ( d ) be the first k nearest receivers, and the tree is formed by the union of k shortest paths between source s and receivers in Q k ( d ) . We call the final tree as k least cost paths tree, denoted as L c m k , and each path selected as a branch. Following, we discuss how to compensate the relay links such that they will relay the data out of their own interests and declare their actual costs.
E. VCG Mechanism is not strategyproof
Intuitively, we would use the VCG payment scheme in conjunction with the k-anycast tree structure L C m k as follows.
The payment to a link that is not in L C m k is 0. And the pay-
However, this simple application of VCG mechanisms is not truthful. We show this by an example that the above payment scheme is not strategyproof for any k. Our example will show that the payment of some selected link ei is negative even it reveal its true cost. S VCG mechanism for LCkTk is not truthful.
An example of our truthful payment scheme based an LCPTK
Fig. 1. Payment Scheme forLCmx
The first part of Figure 1 illustrates the example with terminal s being the source node and qi (1 5 i 5 T ) are possible receivers. The cost of link svl and links vlqi (1 5 i 5 r ) are 1. The cost of link svz is 2 and the cost of links v2qiCl are E , where E is a sufficiently small positive real number. For any 1 < k 5 T , it is not difficult to show that, tree LCPTk is just formed by the link svl plus any k links in the set of links {vlql,vlqz,. . . ,vlq,}, whose weight is 1 + k * 1 = k + 1. Now remove link el = SUI, tree L C m k becomes link su2 plus any k links in {vzql, 21242, ' ' , vzqr}, whose weight is 2 + ke.
Thus, the payment to edge sw1 according to VCG mechanism is (2 + ke) -k -1 + 1 = kek + 2, and edge sv1's utility is k Ek + 1 < 0 when c < y . This violates the individual rationality, which means that the payment based on VCG is not truthful.
C. Strategyproof payment scheme
In subsection m-B, we shown that if we apply VCG mechanism on L c m k , it is not sirategyproof. In this subsection, we will present a non-VCG strategyproof mechanism based on tree LCPTk. Intuitively, we will pay each link ej the maximum cost qj that it could declare while it is still selected in LCFTk. To find this maximum cost for e j , we construct two sets of paths: one is the set of shortest paths to all receivers containing link e j , while the other one is the set of shortest paths to all receivers without using link e j . Notice that if e j is not in LCPTk, then LCmk are the union of the first k shortest paths that do not contain link e j . We can easily find this maximum cost if there is only one shortest path from receivers to the source using link ej. Thus, by assuming LCP ,, (s, qi, d ) is the only path selected in L C m k with link ej for every qi E Q, we can find IQ1 maximum cost candidates. The final maximum cost is the maximum of those candidates. Following algorithm shows how to find the maximum cost in details.
Algorithm I: Strategyproof payment scheme for link e, 1. For each receiver qi E Q, find the shortest path LCP, (s, q,, d ) using link e j . Sort all these shortest paths according to their costs in an ascending order. For simplicity, we assume that the sorting is denoted by an ordering ul, i.e., Notice that herc u l ( t ) denotes that LCP(s,qu,,(,),d) is the t-th longest path among all such shortest paths.
2. Similarly, for each receiver q, E Q, find the shortest path LCP-,,(s,q;,d) without using link e,. Sort all these shortest paths according to their costs in an ascending order. We assume that the sorting is denoted by another ordering U O , i.e., ( u l ( t d , d ) 5 L , ( m ( t z ) , d ) for any 1 i tl 5 t z 5 r. (61(i), d ) -Le, ( U l ( i ) 
L ,
%=I 5. Define qj as 6. If e j E LCPTk(d) then it gets payment q j ; else it gets payment 0.
We show how our payment scheme works by the following example illustrated in the second part of Figure 1 . There are 5 receivers 41, 42. . . ' , qs. Assume that k = 3. It is easy to see that LCmk is formed by links: S U I , U I Q~, vlqz, sv2 and ~2~5 . The selected three receivers will be ql. q2, and q5. Let us see what is the payment for link SUI. The receivers sorted in increasing order of their shortest paths to the source node using link sul are {q5, q l , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 } . The receivers sorted in increasing order of their shortest paths to the source node without using link e = are {q5,qzrq3,q4,q~). Then @ = { q 5 , q z , q 3 } .
Clearly, a = 2 since q1 is the first receiver not in @. --e(45! d) -.&(q5,dljo) = 6, a n d 7 = L-, (o0(3),d) -L,(u1(2) ,dl30) = L ( q 3 , d ) -Le(ql,dljO) = 11 -4 = 7: Thus, the payment to link su1 should he 7 = max (6,7,0) .
In order to prove payment calculated by Algorithm 1 is truthful we first prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1: If link ej E LCPTk(d) then d j 5 qj.
Proof: If e j E LCPTk(d) , there exists at least one i that satisfies ej E LCP(s,qi,d) and qi E Q k ( d ) . If there are more than one such indices, we choose the one that ranks first in the permutation ul. Without loss of generality, we assume such index is u l ( p ) , i.e., its rank is p in sorted shortest paths using link e j . From the assumption that e j is on LCP(s, qr,(ir), d) , we have Le, (ul(@),d) 5 L e i ( u 1 ( @ ) , d ) ,
If p < a, from inequality (4) and equation (I), we have dj 5
So we only need consider the case when @ 2 a. We prove that d j 5 qj by contradiction. For the sake of contradiction, assume that d j > qj. Then dj > qj 2 7j = L e k ( u 0 ( k ) , d ) - Lek(ul(a),dljO) . This implies ' i j 5 q j . .ek(ul(a),d) > L k ( u o ( k ) , d ) Combining the above inequality and assumption p 2 a, we have L k (~d 9 , 4 5 L k (~~( k ) , d ) 
< & k ( u~(~) , d )
5
Lek(ul(@),d) for any 1 5 i 5 k. Remember Proof: We prove by contradiction by assuming that d j < qj. Remember that qj = max{Yj, ~j , O}. We disprove the assumption that d j < qj by three cases. Case 1: q j = 0. This implies that d j < 0, which is impossible from our protocol. Case 2: qj = ' i j .
Remember that nj = maxp_;l{~-., ( u l ( i ) , d ) -L~~ ( u l ( i ) , dljo)}. Without loss of generality we can assume ' ij = L e , ( u l ( t ) , d Cej(ul(t),dljO) , for some index t E [ l , a -11. From the assumption we have d j < qj = ~j = L + ( u~( t ) , d ) - Lej(ul(t),dljO) . This implies that L,(ul(t) ( u 1 ( t ) ,  d) . Consequently, L e , ( U l ( t ) ) d ) < L-e, (U1(t)>d) .
Thus, ej E LCP(s,q,,,(a,d) , which implies that q g l ( t ) @ Qk(d).
Observe that ej @ L C P T k ( d ) implies that we will select @ as the receivers to he spanned. Therefore, qol(t) E 0 which contradict the assumption that qu,(u) is the first receiver in rank u1 that does not belongs to @. Case 3: q j = y j . Combining the above equation and the assumption that di < q j , we get Cei(ul(a),d j ( u 0 ( k ) , d ) .
Remember that e j @ LCPTk(d) implies that Lei(u1(a),d) 2 L e j ( u 0 ( k ) , d ) ,
whichis a w Now we are ready to prove that our payment scheme satisfies contradiction. This finishes OUI proof.
both IC and IR.
Lemma 3: Payment scheme (1) satisfies IR.
Proof: If ej @ LCPTk(d) then ej's valuation and payment are both 0, thus its utility is also 0.
If ej E LCPTk(d) , then its payment is qj. From lemma 1, we know cj 5 qj. Thus, its utility is q jcj 2 0. Thus, our
Pmoj We show that link e j won't increase its utility by lying it cnst. Notice if the output whether e, is selected doesn't change, then its utility doesn't change. Thus, we only need to distinguish the following two cases:
Case 1: Edge ei E LCPTk(dljcj) when it declares its true cost cj and e j $ LCPTk(dl%j) when it declares a cost as 4 > cj . From lemma 1 we have cj 5 qj. If e j declares its true cost cj, it will get utility q j ( d L j )cj 2 0. If ej declares its cost as c j , then it will have utility 0. Thus, edge e j will choose to reveal its true cost.
Case 2: Edge ej 9 LCPTk(d1jcj) when it declares its true cost c j , and ej t LCPTk(dljcj) when it declares its cost as c, < cj. From lemma 2 we havTcj 2 r,j. If e j declares its true cost c j , it will get utility 0. If e j declares its cost as cj, it will have utility qi -c j 0. Thus, edge e, will also chooseto reveal its true cost in this case.
Overall, edge e, maximizes its utility when it reveals its true payment scheme (1) satisfies IR. Lemma 4: Payment scheme (1) satisfies IC.
-cost c j , which means payment scheme (I) satisfies IC.
From Lemma 3 and 4, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Payment scheme 1 is strategyproof.
D. Optimnlity of ourpayment scheme
We proved that our payment scheme is truthful in subsection
In-C. In this subsection, we will prove that it is optimal, i.e., for any strategyproof mechanism P based on output LCpTk, the payment to any link calculated by P is greater than or equal to the payment calculated by Algorithm 1. In other words, we cannot find a strategyproof payment scheme that pays less than our payment scheme. Before we prove this, we prove the following lemma regarding all truthful payment schemes based on LCF'Tr that will he used later to prove the optimality of our payment scheme.
Lemma 6: For any strategyproof mechanism fi whose output is LCPTk, for every link ej, if ej E LCPTk(d) then the payment to edge ej fii(d) should he independent of d k .
Proof: We prove it by contradiction by assuming that there exists a strategyproof payment scheme J? such that J ? j ( d ) depends on d j when ej E LGPTk (d) . There must exist two different valid declared costs a1 # a2 such that @j(dlJai) # p j ( d l j a z ) , ej E LCPTk(dlial) and ej E LCPTk(d(jal) . Without loss of generality we assume that Ijk(dlkal) > pj(clja2). Now consider edge e j with actual cost cj = a2. Obviously, it can lie its cost as a2 to increase his utility, which violates the incentive compatibility (IC) property. Now we show that our mechanism is optimal among all strategyproof mechanism using LCPTk as its output.
Theorem 7: Among any strategyproof mechanism using LCPTk as the output, our mechanism is optimal.
Proof: We provc it by contradiction. Assume that there is another truthful mechanism M = (LCPTk,?) , whose payment is smaller than our payment for a link e j on a graph G = (V, E ) with cost vector c. Assume that the payment calculated by P for link ej is Pj(c) = p j ( c ) -6, wherepj(c) is the payment calculated by Algorithm 1 and 6 > 0. . Now consider the same graph with a different cost c' = cljdj.
where di = p j ( d ) -$. finishes the proof.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
From Lemma 1, we know the payment to any link is greater than or equal to its actually cost. Thus, the total payment is often larger than the actual cost of the k-anycast tree LCpTk.
Let c(LCPTk) be its cost and p(LCPTk) be the total payment by Algorithm 1. We define the overpayment ratio as No doubt, we don't want to overpay too much to guarantee the truthfulness. But unfortunately, Archer and Tardos have shown a simple example in [20] such that the overpayment ratio could be as large as @(n) for unicast problem. By a simple modification of their example, the overpayment ratio for k-anycast could alsc be as large as Q(n).
We conducted extensive simulations to study the overpaymenc ratio of LCpTk structure proposed in this paper. Notice that, we need guarantee that the network is bt-connected to prevenl the possible monopoly of some links. Given a random graph of n vertices, it is known that the graph is bi-connected only when its number of neighbors is in the order of O(1ogn). In our experiment, we randomly generate n terminals, every terminals' number of neighbors are drawn from a uniform distribution from [log(n), 5 log(n)l. The weight of edge is uniformly and randomly selected from [ZO, 1001. In our first experiment, we vary the number of terminals in this region from 100 to 490, and fix the number of sender to 1 and receivers to 30. For a specific number of k, we generate 500 different networks, and study the performance of structure
OR(LCPTk) = Po
C(Lf2PT-k)'
LCPTk according to two metrics: average overpayment ratio (AOR) and maximum payment ratio (MOR). Left and Middle figures of Figure 2 illustrate the maximum overpayment ratio and the average overpayment ratio for three different values: k = 1, 10 and 30. When k = 1, it is just anycast, and for k = 30 it becomes multicast. We also vary the number k from 1 to 30, and fix the number of sender to 1 and receivers to 30.
Right figure of Figure 2 , we show MOR and AOR when fix the number of terminals as 200 an 400 respectively.
In our simulations, we found that the overpayment ratio has a trend of decreasing when the number of network terminals increase, and it becomes almost steady when the number of network terminals reach some threshold.
When we vary both k from 1 to 30 and number of terminals from 100 to 400, we summarize our results in Table I and 11. Notice that when we fix n, both MOR and AOR decrease when k increases: when we fix k and decrease n, both MOR and AOR first decrease then become steady. Another important observation is that when the network is bi-connected (it happens when n 2 100 whp in our simulations) both MOR and AOR are small enough.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we defined a new routing called k-anycast, which has potential applications in several areas such as peerto-peer computing. We then studied how to perform k-anycast in selfish and rational networks, in which every terminal or link will provide services to others only when it receives a payment to compensate its cost, and it will try to maximize its own profit. In this paper, by assuming that each link in the network has a private cost of providing services to other terminals, we design a k-anycast routing protocol such that every terminal will follow this protocol and will maximize its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. Notice that, without modification, our protocol also works in the scenario when each network terminal has a private cost of providing services to other nodes.
A possible future work is to design a routing structure that approximates the minimum cost k-anycast tree, and then design a truthful payment scheme based on that structure. MOR fork = 1 , l O and 30 
